{"code":"WTCXYL","name":"Petr Svenda","biography":"Petr Švenda is a security researcher and teacher at Masaryk University, Czech Republic. His research interests revolve around applied cryptography and the analysis of cryptographic hardware, both from its usage as well as attack direction. He first touched the side-channel analysis of cryptographic devices for the Czech National Cyber and Security Agency in 2002 and has kept his passion for cryptographic smartcards ever since. In 2017, he co-discovered and responsibly disclosed the RSA key generation flaw in Infineon cryptographic chips affecting 1-2 billion devices worldwide, including those used in Estonian eIDs (CVE-2017-15361, ROCA), Minerva ECDSA vulnerability in EAL4+ certified chips (CVE-2019-15809) or extraction of private key from Intel's fTPM implementation using value of only 9 signatures (CVE refused to be assigned by vendor). These experiences led him to further explore the problem of transparent replicable security testing and sensitive information sharing.","submissions":["BUAYFR","3SZHPW"],"avatar_url":"https://talks.openalt.cz/media/avatars/D8DPKE_Z0Ppfeh.webp","answers":[]}